This paper offers an outline of the central issue Hegel is concerned with in his discussion of spirit. The issue is: how can we possibly confirm our basic and comprehensive claims to validity? 1 In the "Spirit" section of the Phenomenology, Hegel focuses on what we nowadays would call "thick conceptions". The corresponding claims to knowledge relate (a) to a general worldview and (b) to the objective norms embedded in this worldview. Furthermore, they also include (c) a claim to self-knowledge, which is correlated to both.
other members of the community, although they are aware that the support for our wellbeing is at stake, do not consider my action as a manifestation of this principle. I cannot justify it publicly and thereby start to wonder to what degree pride, the idea of being exceptional, an attitude of irresponsibility etc., were guiding my action. 4 Furthermore, this action is also in another sense not just an issue of the individual person. Insofar as we are dealing with spirit, the individual person is from the very beginning related to a plurality of others, the community he belongs to, and which orients his action. Bear in mind that the action is based on a claim. In making this claim I expect that others in my community can and will share it, given careful consideration. Since the action is supposed to confirm the claim, it is directed towards being taken up and recognised by others as well. Here is a combination of social semantic externalism and internalism at work: if the action aims at recognition by others, their contribution to the determination of the meaning of the act is also conceded. The individualist aspect in the theory is that this is true only because the individual agent himself accepts it to be so, given the nature of his underlying claim. 56 In respect of the last aspect, consider as an analogy the case of producing a painting. In painting, I want to have the painting interpreted and thereby its meaning determined independently of my subjective conditions. If an artist (such as J. K. Rowling) rejects a reading by referring to what the hero did or what his or her subject is, so to speak, outside of the work of art, we feel that his or her comments do not matter. Nevertheless the painting originates in the artist"s mind, and therefore the reading of others can be quite revealing of the artist and his or her intentions.
It is important to note that we are dealing here with a very specific type of action. It would be a mistake to derive a general theory of action from these Hegelian considerations. There are a number of modes of action which Hegel mentions without including them in his conception of spirit. Of course, we are not dealing with a merely individual mode of acting according to which I appropriate an object that I desire, as is the case in the original acquisition of land or in my taking an object of consumption. Nor are we concerned with a mode of action in which I am aiming to gain recognition for such an act of appropriation while performing it.
Furthermore we are not focusing on a course of action in which I try to reach a good for myself, but at the same time also automatically bring about something that is generally right -perhaps even by following a well established and generally appreciated practice, as is the case in a commercial contract, at least according to the liberal economic theory that Hegel has so carefully examined. What matters for spirit is rather the relation between my action and the idea of what I presuppose to be generally right, whereby what is generally right is realised by my action as well. This implies that there is a double tendency in action. On the one hand, the possibility of realising the action is still bound to individuality; it is bound to the particular agent who performs the action. On the other hand, what matters about his action has to be kept apart from his individuality. Furthermore, the action is not just supposed to confirm the idea of what is generally right. The agent is also intending the action to be recognised by the others for this very reason. 7 A consequence of this is that the action cannot be successful on the basis of the contribution of the individual agent alone; it must be oriented by principles which are already realised in the community. This is the reason why Hegel believes that in analysing knowledge and action he can offer an account of culture and its development. Beside the question of failed action, this last perspective opens up a deeper underlying problem that occupies Hegel in working out this approach. If the act is directed at a general idea of rightness and anchored in society, and if, in turn, the truth of the act comes to light in the act itself: can a general conception ever be transposed into an act? The outer side of the act is always a particular, individual one; in its public result the divergent side will always stick out, while at the same time the act seems too indeterminate to refer to this concept in particular. Is it not inherent in the possibility of action as something determinate that the general sphere gets divided into perspectives and that an uncircumventable partisanship precedes the implementation? 8 Is the result of these problems ultimately that only a negative act is possible, one that clears away all particularities -as Hegel interpreted the French Revolution 9 -or at least distances itself from it, leading to something like a contemplative attitude of knowledge? 10 And finally there is an epistemic formulation of the problem: how can an act be recognised by others as the realisation of a concept if the others always see the result from a different perspective than that of the act"s execution? And can we suppose that a confirmation occurs through the action if it is uncertain which of the two uncertainties obtains -of the thing itself, or of its evaluation? And how is one supposed to deal with this situation?
The reflective attitude toward the role of action for mind outlined by these questions forms the background of Hegel"s more complex set-up of the discussion of spirit in the sixth chapter of the Phenomenology, focusing not only on action but also on language. It is not just that we are always also speaking -Hegel is more concerned with the Humboldtian question of whether language makes up the essence of mind. We can find our way into this issue with the following consideration: if the possibility of confirmation in the action depends on the possibility that the conceptual side can be present in the commonly understood action or be recognised in it, then the question of confirmability entails the issue of expression. And in any event self-understanding and validity claims find their commensurate expression in language. Hegel explicitly emphasises this in his central reflection on the principles of language in the chapter on spirit in the Phenomenology. As he puts it, in relation to the I and its understanding, which is our concern here: in every other expression it is immersed in a reality, and is in a shape from which it can withdraw itself; it is reflected back into itself from its action ... and dissociates itself from such an imperfect existence, in which there is always at once too much and too little, letting it remain lifeless behind. Language, however, expresses it in its purity. (Hegel 1977: 308) In this identification of language as the superior form of expression we find the reason why in the discussion in the Spirit chapter where Hegel deals with language, he always explicitly focuses on the aspect of the speech act. Hegel continues to weave the spiral of his arguments with this background in mind. For speech acts are themselves actions. What sort of act we are dealing with can be brought out through delimitations just as it was before: The linguistic act under consideration does not correspond to "that first act whereby Adam constituted his dominion over the animals … in giving them names, i.e. negating them as being and making them ideal for themselves", 11 which the reflection on language in the first system outline is oriented around. For such an act, according to the above-mentioned differentiations in the concept of action, would in its structure initially be just an act of appropriation. The point here is also not the aim of gaining recognition for this act, which would elevate mere naming to a sort of rudimentary shared language. Nor is the point only that the majority of performances of the act of reference to individual actuality at the same time stabilise a generality, a concept and its use. Rather, the focus here turns to a factual act of communication in relation to others that explicitly assumes a generality and makes use of an already established social practice. As before, we can say that in using the language under the assumption that it is generally shared, I recognise, for my part, that what the others take as what has been said is of relevance to the content of my expression and to my attitude as well. To summarise, we could say: the structure of speech mirrors that of spirit.
That language corresponds to spirit in its structure of action makes a certain aspect characterising Hegel"s approach to the relation between action and speech more plausible: that language and speech are not just analysed as the complement and precondition to the action that is to lead to the confirmation of principles. Equal attention is paid to the situation where speech enters into competition with this action as activity and as expression. In other words: one would expect Hegel to bring language into play on the grounds that what is done is itself something objective wherein the generality in belief or intention and the way it is received in others" recognition could come apart, which would then thwart the action as one of spirit, since the one requires the other. The comprehensive medium of language as better expression would then work to counteract this. In fact, however, Hegel takes up language precisely in the situation where, as he puts it in the same passage about language: "it is the power of speech [...] which performs what has to be performed" (Hegel 1977: 308) . Here, the speech replaces the action. But then, in light of the problem of action, should we not switch over to a theory of language as the existence of spirit? Action is not an adequate expression, but ultimately we cannot achieve any confirmation in the sphere of mere speaking.
This leads to my thesis concerning the interpretation of Hegel: First bear in mind that Hegel does not want to provide a general theory of action, but is concerned with a very specific type of actions given their relation to the underlying validity claim. Then, one has to realise that the structure of Hegel"s famous exposition of spirit in the sixth chapter of the Phenomenology can only be understood if the resulting tension between action and language is taken to be the organising principle.
The dual problem of confirmation and expression is one of the organising principles around which Hegel orientates his interpretation of historical constellations. In the ancient "ethical world", which Hegel interprets through the lens of tragedy, action is the primary factor. Only after the transition to the modern order does speech take centre stage -as a rival to action, and in such a way that speech takes itself as its content and creates a reality due to this performative structure. 12 This is Hegel"s interpretation of the social relations of absolutism literally realised through the speech acts of homage and salutation. Only when the last section once more takes up the problem of the general correctness of particular actions, under the premises of conscience, is the problem brought together with the structure of replacement and opposition between speech and action. 13 
II. Sophocles' Antigone, Absolutism and Conscience as Stages of the

Development of Spirit
I shall begin this section with a look at Hegel"s interpretation of the world of ancient Greece, which is centred around the conception of action. First, a preliminary remark: The self-understanding underlying action in the Greek form of life is grounded in a conception we nowadays would call a thick conception, that is a conception which cannot easily be unpacked or divided into descriptive aspects related to the situation, aspects of self-understanding, and normative aspects. 14 It is such a conception which is related to action. The latter is what unfolds the tragedy, since Hegel conceives of the Greek world in terms of this prominent form of art. 15 Here, with this act, we should not think primarily of the act of Oedipus. It is true that the latter also inverted its character in the course of its execution through the tragic turn of events: it proved not to be a defence of honour and marriage to the queen, but the murder of the father and dishonouring of the mother. Oedipus is brought to selfconsciousness as a perpetrator. But this is first found in the act itself, without already being latent in Oedipus" knowledge, in his understanding of himself and his will. 16 Thus Antigone"s act of burying her brother is more interesting for Hegel, since here the entire setting -in this case both the principle she follows and the principle she turns against -are already contained in her acting consciousness; Antigone is already aware of what principle she violates -the raison d"état. Consequently we can say, in another sense, that her claim to knowledge openly faces its confirmation and that her knowledge guides the action. As always in Hegel"s procedure, the insight is generated by means of failure, and generated in such a way that the acting consciousness comes to this insight itself. As we see in the recognition of guilt on Antigone"s part, which is emphasised by Hegel, this insight entails a change in Antigone"s knowledge of herself. For Antigone does not say that her intention was not directed against the ethical order, or that it wasn"t directed against the ethical order and she didn"t know that it was on Creon"s (the statesman"s) side; nor does she say that the resulting antagonism remains external to her part in the action, which would mean that the action breaks down into an outer side and an epistemically certain inner side. The preference goes to the insight bearing the weight of reality, not to her original knowledge, even including the knowledge of what constitutes her beliefs and intentions as introspectively accessible events; the insight leads her to revise her purported original knowledge within a deeper understanding. 17 Thereby we have just explained how Antigone responds to her failure. But why does she fail? How can the unfolding of the tragedy be interpreted as revealing her failure? Given Hegel"s own presuppositions, this is especially difficult to understand. Bear in mind that the conception she follows is not just based on demands of reason as such or on their application to the specific situation. According to Hegel, such an abstract point of view would be empty and could not be action-guiding. 18 Responding to this argument, one has to claim that Antigone follows insights and norms which are generally recognised in her community -namely the principle of piety towards the dead. Furthermore, Hegel does not want to assume that Antigone"s failure is revealed by features of a reality which are external to and independent of her own knowledge claim. 19 For this assumption would be compatible with neither the concept of self-understanding nor the idea of an immanently evolving critical process. He has to rely on what the individuals within spirit -Antigone among them -take or accept as being real. If we were to rely on the idea of a reality independent of her knowledge, it could turn out that we just take up our own -the modern philosophers" -conception of what is real. But the rationality of the latter depends on how it evolved historically starting from the world of the Greeks, therefore we can"t presuppose it.
If we follow Hegel in looking back to the world of the Greeks, in a next step the ambivalence of the ethical order has to be foregrounded in order to respond to this problem. The ethical order is split up into the law of the polis in a narrow sense and the equally well established principle of piety towards the dead -a principle that treats the deceased still as a person and thereby resists the powers of mere nature. Both principles are bound to the gender roles of the male politician and the female protector of the Gods of the family, exemplified especially in the sister. But this distinction cannot be taken up just as given in a society or even as provided by the natural division of the sexes. It has to be shown how the claims of knowledge and the consciousness of action contribute to such a distinction -if not to its particular content then at least to how a distinction of this type is possible.
If we take a closer look at Hegel"s text, we find that it is not the case that a differentiation in the ethical sphere leads to action; rather, a differentiation in spheres only emerges in the first place in and with action: the differentiation of acting consciousness that Hegel is talking about is one between orientation towards the general goal of action and orientation towards the concrete individual reality. 20 Thus Hegel"s thesis is that orientation to and embeddedness within concrete reality also contribute to
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the determination of how the principles of the other orientation are given. For us, they are always already the general dressed up as the concrete, distinguished according to our situation. How, otherwise, would we be able to act? That action divides the factors does not mean here that the performance of the action creates them -rather, the possibility of action presupposes them. The implementation of this presupposition first occurs under the heading "deed": 21 because the deed is performed by a consciousness with a limited perspective, that which ethical reality has determined under a different point of view -namely, under Creon"s law -is for the acting consciousness only a partisan realisation which has to be opposed by the deed. Consequently, Hegel"s doctrine that every division is at the same time a correlation comes into effect here, and the other side -Creon"s actions against Antigone -is also put into play. Since, however, what actually gets implemented is only what already lies within the possibilities of action, we can say that what we see here is not, in essence, an action that leads to a tragic set of circumstances, but rather the tragedy of action itself. And this fits with Hegel"s approach, which problematises the possibility of confirming the general in action from the very beginning.
What emerges here as a tragedy of action is only retroactively conceived as a linguistic occurrence on Hegel"s account, under the heading "command and lament" (cf. Hegel 1977: 397). Language only takes on a central prominence under the conditions of the emerging modernity. Historically speaking, speech replaces the office of the knight, 22 who fails in the face of the claim to generality, as Antigone had previously. According to Hegel, this early modern situation is a situation of alienation. It is characterised by the loss of knowledge of a foundation. So language becomes the medium of expression for an attitude which, in its essence, consists precisely in speaking. This gives rise to a selfreferential act of speaking. In the ethical world, "language has the essence for its content and is the form of that content; but here it has for its content the form itself, the form which language itself is, and is authoritative as language" (Hegel 1977: 308) .
We can use Marshall McLuhan"s formula to characterise what Hegel is emphasising here as a new and different moment: the medium is the message. The speech act has no content separate from itself -the form of speech it brings about is itself the content it is concerned with. Hence it also realises its own conditions of fulfilment. For this reason, it is speech that "performs what has to be performed" (ibid.), that comes into competition with action. The speech act itself becomes an action that creates order. The latter is the subject of Hegel"s wonderful analysis of how, within absolutism, not only does the form of speech in fact come to take centre stage in place of content in the homage, the salutation, incantation of the princely name, etc., but this is not even a direct second-person address -rather, it serves to literally pronounce into existence the embodiment of the order in the figure of the prince. 23 But with this speech, the speakers only create an institution which they experience themselves as totally dependent upon, and towards which they have to act with consideration for their own advantage. Although this situation involves two subjects facing each other and their operation in an intercessional medium, the relation remains external and objectifying, and falls short of the structure of spirit. The indignation over this dependency and the divided role leads to the dependents judging things quite differently than is expressed in the proclamations of homage. This doubled, divided judgement corresponding to the contradiction in the above-mentioned action produces a situation where every speech act no longer means what it expresses. But this is Hegel"s diagnosis of the irony and the sarcasms of the salon world in which language can appropriate everything, the linguistic form triumphs over everything, and yet precisely because of this the possibility of communication is lost.
Hegel combines an account of action and an account of language in a third historical setting he takes to be a contemporary one. 24 In this setting, the role of language is not any longer characterised by referring to an ultimately empty speech act. In a modern, reflective stance Hegel takes up the essential role of the subject and characterises the speech act as an expression of its conviction; the conviction is supposed to be what is right in the action. We are then not any more dealing with a setting in which a general idea to be realised is opposed to a particular situation in which we have to act; since the conviction manifests itself in conscience; conscience indicates what is right; and it does so in response to a particular situation. 25 But still the action should not be an expression of a merely private attitude. This is the reason why being grounded in the recognition of the society is not just important, but becomes decisive. Only the recognition accounts for objectivity in this model. But then, the reflective stance, of course, doesn"t solve the problem of action, since it is particularly difficult to grasp whether or not an action was done on the basis of conviction and conscience. Affirming that the action was done by conscience seems to replace the very action itself -this is Hegel"s diagnosis of the protestant community of pietism, which was influential in 18 th century Germany.
Hegel goes on and personalises the conflict between action and language, imagining that one person acts such that the particular deed and the claim of being recognisably done by conscience come apart, whereas the other person is characterised by the linguistic act of judgement, condemning the first for this very reason. But this means that the judging person does less than the acting person, since the mere speech act cannot provide confirmation. She is even not better than the acting person, for she can judge the act as not being recognisably done by conviction only if she introduces her own particular attitudes. 26 If we look back we might expect that an action, as it relates to a conception, is explained and justified in the common medium of language, and that this can lead both to confirmation and to the recognition of the action as an expression of its origin. But this is not the path that Hegel takes. It is not just that the action occurs -at the start in relation to the substantial ethical order, at the end in relation to conscience -in light of an instance that, in its essential position, cannot be entirely assimilated to linguistic mediation. The very basic dilemma of action as an expression also remains. 27 Spirit develops less in overcoming this problem than in the ways one responds to it. And this is where language comes into play as this involves transformations in the speech-act of confession -a confession of having fallen short of generality. The recognition of failure by Antigone that Hegel emphasises against the grain of the Sophoclean context, because it is mediated by suffering, is nothing more than the expression and representation of the factual power of the ethical that has come into effect against her through her deed. The passive moment of mirroring that this entails does not match the character of acceptance and ownership in the speech act; we find this confirmed in the fact that Hegel downplays what he says about her lament, calling it "more the shedding of a tear about necessity" (Hegel 1977: 396) . The confession also plays a role in the chapter on language and absolutism. The split consciousness resulting from this constellation says "the words "shameful", "ignoble" … about itself" (Hegel 1977: 318) . However, this itself is still subject to the perversion of meaning; "the repudiated consciousness changes round into the nobility which characterises the most highly developed freedom of selfconsciousness" (Hegel 1977: 317 ). Yet if the perversion that consciousness avows of itself is but the expression of the latest intellectual fad and is understood in that way, then this again falls short of the structure of the confession and what it actually executes is a different speech act. Only when the subject has been fully taken hold of and when the expression is conceived from that point of view is the speech act truly one of confession. This is only possible within language. Thus Hegel concludes the chapter with the following claim: "The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent spirit" (Hegel 1977: 408) .
III. Pragmatist and Historical Features in Hegel
In my final remarks, I would like to point to three very general features of Hegel"s account that I take to be worthy of consideration.
(1) It is important to note that Hegel is not only concerned with practical principles. Overall, he is primarily interested in broader conceptions which include both practical and theoretical claims to knowledge, as well as forms of self-knowledge. These conceptions are not supposed to be confirmed by means of external and independent facts or institutions considered as merely given -even if this would be facts about me or us. What matters is the relation of these conceptions to our actions.
But if this is true, then it is helpful to consider the proximity of Hegel"s account to American pragmatism. According to the pragmatists, the relevant questions are no longer, "Is there anything objective underlying my beliefs and my convictions? Do my beliefs and convictions correspond to it?", but rather: "What difference does holding a particular belief make in my course of action?" "Will my action be successful if it is grounded on these conceptions?" Furthermore, for both Hegel and the pragmatists the action is orientated towards the others from the very beginning. An action is what it is only by aiming at and by referring to the recognitional pattern of the community.
Having said this much, I want to continue by drawing the contrast between these two positions, in order better to understand Hegel"s approach. In a certain pragmatist tradition begun by James, for example, the practice in ordinary life is the real test case. 28 Truth is a value in this practice; but the fact that it is a value is taken to be usually coinciding with the fact that it serves other goods as well. In opposition to this line of thought, Hegel is more interested in a form of action that primarily aims at exploring, revealing and defending validity claims. In this respect, his account is closer to parts of Peirce"s theory. 29 But a contrast to a Peircean theory can be put forward as well. Peirce seems to have in mind primarily an experimental, scientific process of confirmation. It focuses on theories which are in their form close to scientific theories. But Hegel claims that, if there are theories of this type, they are always embedded in the framework of a more general worldview, including norms and our self-understanding; it shapes the culture and its forms of expression. Hegel suggests that this worldview is also susceptible to confirmation and lack of confirmation, and therefore for evolution and also rationality.
(2) Let us focus on these worldviews in general and on the three historical stages outlined in particular. In so doing, we encounter another striking feature of Hegel"s theory.
According to Hegel, it turns out that the process of a realisation in action also depends on presuppositions, which are inevitable, but which are nevertheless not to be fully taken up within the general, linguistically mediated insight that is supposed to result from the process. They can"t even be reconstructed within the resulting knowledge. 30 The speech act of confession which Hegel analyses refers to these preconditions only in a negative mode. Examples are the factual power of the ethical life in the particular form presupposed in the Greek world and one"s position in it, or, in the last stage, the fact that one"s conscience reveals something and what it is that it reveals. We have access to these features because we occupy the first person standpoint. In addition, we can and must partly identify with the historical characters; otherwise the Phenomenology could not fulfil its task.
However, these features imply the danger of mistakenly treating something particular or even individual as general and acceptable for everyone. This is why Hegel"s approach needs to be balanced with his account of intersubjective recognition. Intersubjective recognition allows us both to limit these features and to attribute a position to them within spirit. But how can the recognition correctly fulfil this task? One cannot rely on an analogy with Peirce"s assumption that what is ultimately relevant is what an ideal, infinite community of researchers would acknowledge. 31 Hegel would classify this assumption as an abstract, Kantian norm. It is too indeterminate to guide us. Rather we have to learn from the historical process of negotiating claims within a community.
(3) This leads us to a third and final remark. According to Hegel, the possibility of achieving a general conception which can be recognised by others and understanding correctly what matters from a general point of view is itself an historical accomplishment we acquire by means of the processes of realisation mentioned above. Kant and Fichte thought that general consciousness is a point of view which everybody can and has to take up, implying that to do so is a matter of will. For Hegel, their position is itself the result of a historical development and sapience. But to make such a claim demands that one conceive of this process in a way that avoids the danger of drowning again in the seas of historical contingencies. What is necessary is to conceive of a way in which issues of understanding validity and confirmation can be tied up with at least parts or fragments of historical developments. But that is exactly what Hegel wants to provide.
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1 Note that in the following I will sometimes call these claims "claims to knowledge", thereby suggesting a continuity with the topic of the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology. The fact that Hegel is concerned with so-called "thick conceptions" of the world and human beings" role within it allows him to focus on different aspects in the subsequent chapters of the Phenomenology. In particular, the transition to the chapters on religion and absolute knowledge becomes unintelligible if one does not assume that we are dealing with thick conceptions. 2 We will see in the subsequent sections of the paper that, according to Hegel, this also holds for the genuinely practical component of the conception in question: even norms need to be realised in order to allow for assessment and confirmation. 3 The difference between Hegel"s description of action and a causal account was emphasised first by Taylor (1983 Taylor ( /1985 . 4 Antigone"s case is, of course, such a case of civil disobedience. 5 I agree with Robert Pippin (2008: 147-179 ) that, in the run-up to the sixth chapter of the Phenomenology as well as in the sixth chapter itself, features of social externalism become prominent in Hegel"s description of action. However, I disagree with much of the framework that Pippin uses in order to account for these features. First of all, Pippin assumes that, in these chapters, Hegel intends to provide a general theory of agency. One consequence of this assumption is that, surprisingly, the social character of the action seems itself to become one of the metaphysical properties of action (see, for example, 2008: 173). As Pippin concedes, this leads to seemingly counter-intuitive consequences. I don"t think that Hegel has the intention of providing such a theory. Externalist features apply to action only insofar as this action is meant to verify a claim in the sense mentioned in Note 1. Most actions do not have this purpose. Furthermore, these externalist features apply to action only because the agent himself wishes that these features apply -he invites the others to get involved. The agent wants these features to apply precisely because he wants both to express and verify a claim; since making a claim, in turn, itself has an intersubjective character, as Hegel has already emphasised in the chapter on sense certainty. This interpretation has two advantages: (a) relying on the
